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Abstract
This article discusses various ethical and legal concepts regarding euthanasia and includes concepts like physician assisted suicide, 
assisted suicide, voluntary active euthanasia, killing vs. letting die, indirect euthanasia and terminal sedation. Is there a difference if 
death is only foreseen but not intended? This article opens up the debate and addresses pertinent issues for the family practitioner.
 This article has been peer reviewed. Full text available at www.safpj.co.za SA Fam Pract 2008;50(3):38-39
Introduction
Euthanasia is usually defined as a good (eu) death (thanasia). To 
be good, death should be desired and it ought to be peaceful and 
painless. The concept of euthanasia would not apply to a person who 
slips away peacefully and painlessly without any intervention after a 
fulfilled life because euthanasia involves an intervention by the person, 
or by a person acting on his or her behalf to hasten a wanted death. 
The word euthanasia has three meanings: (1) a quiet and easy death; 
(2) the means of procuring it; and (3) the action inducing this. What is 
missing here is the exclusion of the good of the person whose death is 
in question and the fact that the death is desired for that person’s sake. 
Euthanasia cannot be morally justified unless it benefits the person 
who dies.1
Discussion
Euthanasia is classified according to four criteria: voluntary vs 
involuntary, and active vs passive. What might be confusing is that in 
The Netherlands the term euthanasia is no longer further specified 
because it means voluntary active euthanasia (which is legal), as 
opposed to physician assisted suicide (PAS) (which is illegal).2 
According to the subclass, euthanasia has various ethical and legal 
implications. Some forms are only tolerated (i.e. they are not legally 
permissible but not subject to prosecution) in some countries while 
they are legal in others. To date, most countries have not legalised 
any form of euthanasia. From an ethical vantage point, most of the 
debate centres on the active (commission) and passive (omission) 
dilemma, or killing vs letting die.3 Killing involves causing intentional 
and unjustifiable death of another or taking the life of a person who 
does not wish to die.4,5 Some argue that what matters is not the manner 
of causing death (omission or commission) but the circumstances 
in which the death is caused.6 Others insist that there is a morally 
fundamental difference between omission and commission, between 
killing and letting die.7
Voluntary active euthanasia (VAE) refers to a clearly competent patient 
making a voluntary and persistent request for aid in dying.8 In this case 
the individual or a person acting on that individual’s behalf (physician 
or lay person, according to the law of the country) takes active steps 
to hasten death.9 That active step can be either the provision of the 
means (i.e. a lethal drug) for self-administration (orally or parenterally), 
or the administration by a tier. The provision of the means to die is 
called assisted suicide, assistance in dying, or PAS. The patient acts 
last. With VAE the assistant acts last. Doctor Jack Kevorkian’s (dubbed 
“doctor death”) “Mercitron” is an example of assisted suicide. The 
contraption is hooked to the incumbent who initiates the delivery of 
the lethal drug. With VAE the lethal drug needs to be administered by 
an assistant because the incumbent is physically unable to proceed 
unaided. In both circumstances the individual expresses a competent 
and voluntary wish to die, and the conditions that would make it right to 
allow or assist a suicide are satisfied. In both cases the aim is to spare 
that person pain, indignity, emotional and financial burdens. Yet suicide 
is seen as morally reprehensible, but is not prohibited by any law. 
VAE, on the other hand, is illegal in most countries and is the object of 
conflicting and polarised moral debate.
PAS involves an affirmative act, such as writing a prescription or 
providing the lethal drug. VAE requires the acts of providing and 
administering the lethal drug. In PAS the individual who wishes to die 
commits the final act, while in VAE, because that individual is unable 
to pose the last act, a proxy acts on his or her behalf. The difference 
is about the person who acts last. The intention and motivation are 
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the same. Therefore, one might wonder whether the distinction is 
not a kind of hypocritical hair splitting. It reminds us of the omission/
commission debates, and the doctrine of double effect.
The doctrine of double effect states that for an action with two 
consequences, one good and one bad, to be morally permissible 
the bad consequence may be foreseeable but not intended, and the 
bad cannot be used to achieve the good. The Dutch debate about 
indirect euthanasia illustrates the point. “Terminal sedation” is legally 
permissible; it consists of administering large oral doses of barbiturates 
to induce coma, followed by a neuromuscular blocking agent to cause 
death on request of patients wishing their death to be hastened.2 Death 
is foreseen (and in fact wished for by the incumbent) but not intended. 
Furthermore, the incumbent takes the first step actively; the second 
step inevitably requires the active intervention of an assistant. So, here 
we have two actors with the same motives. Both foresee the result. To 
claim that it is not intended is sheer casuistry.
Many bureaucratic procedures need to be overcome by those wishing 
to die. The main reason is to avoid the legendary “What if?” In spite 
of good evidence against it, the most commonly advanced reason is 
that of avoiding the slippery slope. For instance, in Switzerland, where 
assisted suicide and VAE have been tolerated (they are illegal, but 
not prosecutable if the assistant has no hidden agenda) since 1918, it 
accounts for 0.45% of deaths (only a little more than the 0.3% in the 
Netherlands).10 The candidate has to activate the “death machine” 
or has to swallow the lethal drug; in other cases the incumbent first 
ingests the drug but the final blow is administered by a tier. The 
death is foreseen but not intended. Who is the actor? What is active 
(commission) and what is passive (omission)? Removing a feeding 
tube is an act of commission and, since the intention is death, it is 
killing. Not pouring sustenance in the tube is omission, or letting die. 
The intention is the same, but the type of action is different. Does it 
really matter? As pointed out by Sullivan, the debate places the doctor 
at the centre instead of the applicant.11 It leaves out the good of the 
person who wishes to die.  
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